The Full Bench in Chikka Kullegowda's case, ILR 1991 KAR 4557, 1991 (3) KarLJ 142 , after considering the various cases, including Siddamma's case, held as follows: "The above discussion makes it clear: (a) Rule 43-J contemplated grants to persons who were already cultivating the lands for several years, by being in possession in pursuance of temporary leases granted to them, who formed a separate and distinct class; and in such cases, there was no need to stipulate any of the conditions specified in Rule 43-G which were applicable to only grants relating to unoccupied lands where possession was yet to be delivered; (b) in view of the non-obstante clause with which Rule 43-J began and in the absence of any indication in Rule 43-J that the grants under that rule to persons who were already in possession would be governed by the conditions in Rule 43-G and having regard to the express provision in Rule 43-G that the conditions therein would apply only to the grants made in the preceding rules (that is, Rules 43-C and 43-D, the only inescapable conclusion is that conditions stipulated in Rule 43-G were inapplicable to grants under Rule 43-J. We are thus in respectful agreement with the views expressed in Siddamma's case, supra. We, therefore, answer the question referred for opinion in the negative"

Smt. Hambamma vs State Of Karnataka And Others AIR 1998 Kant 91, ILR 1999 KAR 261, 1998 (3) KarLJ 688 Once the conditions stipulated in Rule 43-G cannot be applied to the grants under Rule 43-J as there is no power or authority to impose any condition stating that the land granted under Rule 43-J cannot be alienated for a period of 15 years or any other period. It is a settled principle of law that the delegate cannot exceed his power and he has only to act within the power conferred on him. Therefore, the condition imposed by the Tahsildar in the Saguvali Chit, at the time of issuing the same, that the grantee shall not alienate the land for a period of fifteen years, when such condition was not imposed by the order or the authority making the grant, cannot be sustained.

Smt. Hambamma vs State Of Karnataka And Others AIR 1998 Kant 91, ILR 1999 KAR 261, 1998 (3) KarLJ 688 The second question for consideration is what is the effect of the condition imposed by the Tahsildar at the time of issuing the Saguvali Chit. The granting Authority, as well as the Tahsildar, derive their power from Rule 43-J. When there is no power to impose any condition in the Saguvali Chit under Rule 43-J, at the time of grant, the subordinate authority, i.e., the Tahsildar has exceeded his limit in imposing the condition. The Tahsildar being the delegate, has no power to impose any condition in the Saguvali Chit. Even if such condition is imposed, the same is not valid in the eye of law and it is without power and jurisdiction. Therefore, the condition imposed by the Tahsildar in the Saguvali Chit stating that the grantee cannot alienate the land for a period of 15 years or any other period is not valid. In the absence of any such condition, it is open to the grantees to enjoy the land as they like, including the right to alienate the land.

Smt. Hambamma vs State Of Karnataka And Others AIR 1998 Kant 91, ILR 1999 KAR 261, 1998 (3) KarLJ 688 The learned Counsel for the original grantees contended that the grant is not under Rule 43-J, but it is under Rule 43-G. We have perused the orders of the original authority cancelling the grant and upholding the same by the Appellate Authority. Both the orders show that the grantees were in possession on temporary lease when they were granted the land by virtue of Rule 43-J; whereas for the grantees under Rule 43-C the unoccupied lands are given. Therefore, the grants involved in these cases are under Rule 43-J and therefore, we are not able to accept the contention of the original grantees. .. It is also contended that the State has collected the upset price from the grantees. Therefore, the grant has to be presumed under Rule 43-C and Rule 43-D and other sub-clauses. Government has taken a policy decision to grant the lands to temporary holders on a concessional price. After Rule 43-J is framed, such lands are granted to various persons and concessional price is collected. Merely because some price is collected, it cannot be said that the collection of upset price is not correct. The impugned grant is under Rule 43-G, when it was actually made under Rule 43-J. Even on this aspect, we do not see any force in the contention raised by the learned Counsel for the original grantees.


Smt. Siddamma v. Chikkegowda and Ors., 1991(1) Kar. L.J. 210 (DB) which was affirmed by a Division Bench in Siddamma's case, wherein law has been clearly stated that in respect of lands granted under the provisions of Section 43-J of the Mysore Land Revenue Code, 1888, no condition restricting alienation of the land could have been imposed; that any sale of such land can never be said to be in violation of the terms of the grant nor of any condition which in fact cannot be imposed by the authorities granting the land; that in spite of such sale transactions, the authorities under the Act does not assume jurisdiction for examination of an application under Section 4 of the Act.

Onkarappa vs Sanna Neelappa ILR 1990 KAR 727, 1990 (1) KarLJ 54 Another important aspect which requires to be noticed in these cases is that all these grantees were invested with possession anterior to the grand of lands made on 11-2-1960 by lease of lands to the grantees prior to 11-2-1960 under the "Grow More Food Scheme". Even though undue importance cannot be attached to possession given under the Grow More Food Scheme in the form of a lease, too much of emphasis on possession becomes superfluous in the context. At the risk of repetition, it has to be observed that what is relevant and germane to the issue is whether in all these cases alienation has taken place before the expiry of a period of ten years from the date of commencement of the grants. My opinion is that there is no violation of the condition imposed against alienation for a period of ten years. Computing the period from the date of the grant, it has to be held that in all these cases, alienation has taken place after the expiry of the period of ten years.

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