Nagamma vs Deveeramma 2001 (6) KarLJ 373 Mysore Act No. 10 of 1933 (Mysore Hindu Law Women's Rights Act, 1933) had been in force on the First day of January, 1934. The question is what is the effect of the provisions of this Act. This Act no doubt governs succession to interest in the property, after coming into force of the Act, it had the effect of regulating the succession to the property in case of a male Hindu dying intestate. The Act declare that it shall come into force on the first day of January 1934. The Act became applicable to persons who but for the passing of this Act, would have been subject to the law of Mitakshara in respect of matters for which the provisions are contained in the Act. Section 3 does not reveal that it is retrospective in operation.

High Court of Mysore in Hutcha Thimme-gowda v. Dyavamma, AIR 1954 Mys 93. The foregoing shows that the Mithakshara law in force in the former Princely State of Mysore was different from the law which was in force in the State of Madras. It could further be seen that the personal laws of Hindus in Madras as well as in the former Princely State of Mysore were amended by statutes passed by Legislature which were in force in the respective areas.
Chinnamma vs Srinivas AIR 1971 Mys 28, (1970) 2 Mys LJ Bench: C Honniah, E Venkataramiah It is well settled law that a Hindu belonging to Mithakshara School continues to be governed by the law in force in the area to which he belongs even though he may migrate to some other area, until it is proved that the family has adopted the Mithakshara law which is in force in the area to which the family has migrated. It is enough to refer In support of what is stated above to a decision of the Privy Council in Abdurahim v. Halimabai, AIR 1915 PC 86, in which it is observed as follows;-- "Where a Hindu family migrates from one part of India to another, prima facie, they carry with them their personal law, and, if they are alleged to have become subject to a new local custom, this new custom must be affirmatively proved to have been adopted....." The position would not be different even when a part of one State is taken out of that State and added on to another for administrative reasons. That was the view which was expressed by the Privy Council in Somashekara Royal v. Sugutur Mahadeva Royal, AIR 1936 PC 18, in which it was held that the mere transfer of a district to another presidency for administrative purposes was not sufficient to affect the personal law of the residents in that district, unless and until it was shown that in the case of any resident there that he had intended to change and had in fact changed his personal law. …….. The mere fact that Venkata-swamy had gone to Mysore in search of an employment cannot, therefore, be considered as sufficient to hold that there was change of his personal law unless it is shown that he intended to do so. Further, in this case it is to be seen that it is not pleaded in the plaint that there was any such change of personal law, applicable to the family of the parties to these proceedings on account of their intention to do so. This question is a question of law and fact and unless proper pleadings are placed before the court and necessary evidence is led in support of the pleadings, it would not be possible to hold that there was such a change in the personal law governing the family. ………… It may also be mentioned here that by virtue of the personal law of the parties derived from the texts which constitute the source of the law, the plaintiff would not be entitled to a share in the family properties on the ground that the properties have passed on to the hands of the sole surviving coparcener. Such a right was created for the first time by the Mysore Act of 1933 which came into force on 1-1-1934 in the former princely State of Mysore. So unless it is established that the parties to this suit were governed by the Mysore Act of 1933, the plaintiff would not be entitled to a share on the ground that the joint family properties passed to the hands of a sole surviving coparcener on the death of Venkataswamy.

High Court of Mysore in Keshava Anantha Dixit v. Rama Dixit, (1947) 25 Mys LJ 94. That was a case in which a Hindu male who belonged to a family that migrated to former Mysore State from Ranibennur in Dharwar District in the days of his paternal grand-father, died intestate in Mysore after the Mysore Act of 1933 came into force, leaving immoveable property in Mysore. He and his father who had pre-deceased him were born in Mysore after the migration. After his death the plaintiffs who were the sons of his mother's sisters, filed a suit claiming to be his nearest heirs according to the school of Hindu Law that prevailed at Ranibennur at the time of migration. The suit was resisted by the defendants who were the paternal grand-father's sister's sons of the Hindu male in question on the ground that they were the nearest heirs to succeed to his estate according to the Hindu Law Women's Rights Act of 1933 in force in Mysore. The Court found that the members of the family who migrated to Mysore had become the subjects of the Maharaja of Mysore, and, therefore, they were governed by the Mysore Act of 1933 which laid down a course of succession different from the one on which the plaintiffs based their suit.
High Court of Mysore in Chikka Kempegowda v. .Madaiya, (1951) 29 Mys LJ 64 in which it was held that the interest that was acquired in a joint family property by a Hindu female governed by Mitakshara under Clause (d) of Section 8 (1) of the Mysore Act of 1933, was a vested right which was heritable and transferable. This view of the former High Court of Mysore receives support from a decision of the Supreme Court in Nagendra Prasad v. Kempananjamma, AIR 1968 SC 209 . While construing the provisions of Section 8 (1) (d) of the Mysore Act of 1933 Bhargava, J-, speaking for the court observed as follows:-- "This example makes it clear that the scope of ascertainment of the females who are to receive a share under Clause (d) must be very wide, because Clause (d) mentions that when the joint family property passes to a single coparcener by survivorship, the right to shares is vested in all the classes of females enumerated in all the three Clauses (a), (b) and (c). That being the position, we do not think that Clause (d) can be interpreted narrowly as giving a right to only those females who happen to be related to one or the other of the last two male coparceners in the manner laid down in Clauses (a) and (b). In fact the language of Clause (d) has to be interpreted as laying down that right to shares will vest in all females of the joint Hindu family who would have possibly received the right to a share if at any earlier time there had been oarti-tion in the family in any of the three manners laid down in Clauses (a), (b) and (c). This intention can only be given effect to on the basis that Clause (d) does not restrict itself to finding out females on the basis of an assumed partition, between the last two male coparceners. It is significant that Clause (d) gives a right independently of a partition and we do not see why its scope should be restricted by assuming a partition. The reference to the earlier Clauses in this Clause must be held to be restricted to the sole purpose of ascertainment of the females falling under Clauses (a), (b) and (c). and once they are ascertained, it has to be held that each one of them becomes entitled to a share under this Clause. The object of Clause (d) is to give to all females entitled to maintenance from the coparcenery property a right to claim a share in the joint family property instead of a right to maintenance and that is why reference is made in it to all females enumerated in Clauses (a), (b) and (c)....." It is therefore clear from the observations of the Supreme Court extracted above, that females who are entitled to a share under Clause (d) of Section 8 (a) of the Mysore Act of 1933, acquire a vested right to a share as laid down by that section. There is no provision in the Mysore Act of 1933 which provides for a vested right being created in respect of a share of a joint family property on a second occasion when the joint family properties pass on the hands of a sole surviving coparcener during the lifetime of the same female who is entitled to a share under that provision.

Nagendra Prasad vs Kempananjamma AIR 1968 SC 209 :- Clause (a) of sub-s. (1) of s 8 of the Hindu Law Women's Rights Act 1933, provided that at a partition of joint family property between a person and his son or sons, those entitled to share with them would be his mother his unmarried daughters, and the widows and unmarried daughters of his predeceased undivided sons and brothers who had no male issue. Clause (b) provided that when the partition was between brothers, those entitled to share with them would be their mother, their unmarried sisters, and the widows and unmarried daughters of their predeceased undivided brothers who had left no male issue. According to cl. (c) clauses (a) and (b) would apply, mutatis mutandis, to a partition among other coparceners in a joint family. Clause (d) laid down that when a joint family property passed to a single coparcener by survivorship it would so pass subject to the right to share of the classes of females enumerated in the earlier clauses. Sub-s.(2) of s. 8 fixed the shares of the aforesaid relatives. Sub-s.(3), inter alia, defined the term 'mother' as including whether there were both a mother and a step-mother, all of them jointly, and the term 'son' as including a step-son, a grandson and a great grandson. It also provided that the Provisions of the section relating to the mother would be applicable, mutatis mutandis, to the paternal grandmother and great grandmother. …………… It is, however, to be noticed that s. 8, in conferring rights on females, envisages two different circumstances in which that right is to accrue to them. The first circumstance is when there is a partition of the joint family property between any co-parceners, and the other is when, though there is no partition, the entire joint Hindu family property passes to a single male owner. It is in both these cases that the Act envisages that the property may lose its character of co-parcenary property, because the co-parcenary body may cease to exist on partition or on survival of a single male member of the family. It seems that the purpose of S. 8 was to safeguard the interests of females in such contingencies where the co-parcenary property is to disappear either by partition or by survival of a sole male member. The legislature seems to have felt that, in such circumstances, it was not safe to leave the females entitled to maintenance, etc, at the mercy of the individuals who may receive property on partition or at the mercy of the individual in whom absolute rights in the property might vest as a result of sole survivorship. For the first contingency, when there is a partition, provision was made in clauses (a), (b) & (c) of sub-section (1) of S. 8 under which a right was granted to the females to ask for separation of their shares if the male members decided to have a partition. Unless the male members themselves sought a partition, it was not considered necessary to grant any right to the females themselves to ask for partition, because the property could not lose its character as co- parcenary property until the male members of the family sought partition. The right of the females under clauses (a), (b) & (c) of section 8(1), therefore, only arises at a partition between the male co-parceners forming the joint Hindu family.

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